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Abstract
The emerging research and application domains of the Internet-of-Things and Big Data, together with socio-technical phenomena
such as social networking, as well as mobile phones (equipped with sensors, GPS, etc.) make us – companies, research centres,
people in general – all (sometimes unwittingly, possibly unwillingly) producers and consumers of data. A sensitive issue for data
providers concerns control over access, sharing, dissemination and use of data. By control, we mean placing limitations on who
can access the data, when data can be accessed, how data can be accessed, and so on. We propose means to capture the expression
of controls over data and to associate that indivisibly with the data via what we call “policy-carrying data” (PCD). The PCD
establishes permissions for what the consumer may do to the data, but also – in a novel addition for such policies – establish what
the consumer can/must do subsequently with the data. We formalise PCD and illustrate how it can meet potential stakeholder
requirements.
c© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
The ever-reducing cost of sensors, their increasing variety, fuelled by advances in smart materials, and their incor-
poration in every day devices are indeed realising the Internet of Things and are capable of creating the foreseen data
deluge. The availability and the volume of data motivate ﬁrst-order questions such as (i) what data can be sensed phys-
ically and (ii) what information can be recovered, although second-order issues such as (i) to whom the data belong
and to whom information derived from the data belongs (ii) to whom the knowledge derived from this information
belongs and to what risks stakeholders are exposed as a result of this information and this knowledge remain less
explored. These less explored issues may hinder progress of the ﬁrst-order issues through the creation of regulation,
where, although there is plenty of privacy legislation, none was designed for these circumstances; legal thinking and
interpretation operate at a much slower pace than technological innovation.
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We propose means to capture the expression of controls over (derived) data and to associate that indivisibly with
the data via what we call “policy-carrying data” (PCD1). Following policy conventions, in deﬁning the who, the when
and the how, the PCD establishes permissions for what the consumer may do to the data. A novel aspect of our
proposal is the establishment of obligations concerning what the consumer should do with the (derived) data and it
is these that are the foundation of transparency. Such obligations are the transactional unit for a non-pecuniary data
economy, where access to and use of data may be traded for obligations that act as a form of user-deﬁnable, liquidity
at-point-of-use community currency[14]. These obligations may pertain directly to actions of data consumers or – and
this is another signiﬁcant novelty of our approach – indirectly to the policy associated either with the extracted data
or the data derived from them.
A feature of the current data landscape is the relative freedom of movement of data from individuals to the data silos
used in cloud computing and thence between silos, which could be viewed as contributary to the disempowerment that
individuals might feel over their own data – privacy controls aside [5]. The situation is potentially further complicated
since the platform may enable the collection and interpretation of those data, thus adding value to them, as in the case
of activity-monitoring devices or home energy monitors. The PCD concept associates data with bespoke policies: for
example, framework policies might be deﬁned by legislation, while speciﬁc policies for individual needs would have
to satisfy the norms established at the primary level [13]. In this way, crisp but unworkable deﬁnitions of issues such as
“When do data stop being private?” and “How to decide if data revelation is in the public interest?” can be blurred as
distinctions are established to meet the needs of a given situation.
Legislation will necessarily lag behind practice, but also, we contend, can only ever offer a high-level framework
because of the potentially huge variety of regulations that seem likely to be required. Furthermore, by its nature
legislation (and its revision) tends to take a retrospective view rather than being deﬁned with foresight in mind. The
concept of data wrapped up in a policy – policy-carrying data (PCD) – forms the basis for the realization of a data-
sharing economy based on the transfer of obligations to provide an achievable combination of privacy and transparency
rather than unachievable – and arguably undesirable – absolute privacy. Thus, we offer a formal model of PCD and
we show how this model can be put to use via reasoning mechanisms and illustrative PCDs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We put forward a formal and a computational model for the com-
bination of policies and data, presenting and justifying a reference architecture in Section 2. In Section 3 we present
our formalism for PCDs – its syntax and operational semantics. In Section 4 we outline reasoning mechanisms which
stakeholders can make use of when using PCDs. We discuss our approach and contrast it with related work in Section 5
and we conclude in Section 6, setting out some avenues for future work.
2. A Framework for Policy-carrying Data
In this section we set out a reference framework within which we situate and connect stakeholders, PCDs and an
information model. We illustrate our framework in Fig. 1, where
we show stakeholders (circles), processes (arrows) and informa-
tion model (boxes within central box). The stakeholders envisaged
are (i) data owners/producers who make data/information available
(represented as the left-hand circle) and, in a richer version of the
model, these may be separated into those that assert rights over the
data and those that publish it; (ii) data consumers who want to ac-
cess data (represented as the right-hand circle) and again in a richer Fig. 1: A Framework for Policy-carrying Data
version of the model, there may be entities that are both consumers and producers of data, either by offering aggre-
gation services or by adding value in some way; (iii) monitor/police who are responsible for monitoring/policing the
publication and access activities (represented by the upper circle in the middle).
We note that the ﬁrst two types of stakeholders can be institutions or people as well as computational entities/de-
vices such as sensors, programs, databases, and so on. The monitor/police works as a third-party authority ensuring
that activities (publishing and accessing) follow policies and dealing with violations. Each of these stakeholders has
1PCD also stands for “policy-carrying data collection” and we use PCDs (in the plural) to indicate a set of policy-carrying data collections.
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their speciﬁc ways to interact via the repository: (i) Publishing (represented by the blue solid line) is the process
whereby data owners/producers make their data available but “wrapped” within a policy, that is, they publish, in a
repository, some policy-carrying data. (ii) Accessing (represented by the red dotted lines) is the process whereby data
consumers attempt to obtain access to data mediated via policies. (iii) Monitoring (represented by the green line)
concerns observing activities and checking for policy compliance or violation, and dispensing rewards or sanctions.
Our framework relies on an information model comprising the PCD – a policy and a data collection made available
through the policy – and a history – a collection of events (i.e., a record of activities carried out) gathered at particular
time points, denoted as the states of the repository. We present our framework in a conceptual, technology-agnostic,
and more abstract viewpoint for the sake of generality and to enable a more succinct description of essential features
which technicalities would be a distraction. The framework would support stakeholders carrying out the cycle of
publish-access-monitor activities supported by a Web server. Although we introduce our framework using a single
server, this can be replicated across many servers, provided these can synchronize their information. Servers should
be equipped with functionalities to enable the policing of those accessing and uploading PCD, keeping records of
usage and (non-)compliance, and enforcing the policies’ access control. We envisage programmatic access to PCD,
whereby programs and functionalities developed with speciﬁc technologies can access any PCD, interacting with the
server via pre-establised protocols.
A typical PCD would express something like “Lab managers can access 500 records of my data”. If an interested
party requested 1,000 records, the server would (i) check the credentials of the requester (who needs to be registered);
(ii) grant access to 500 records (a message would provide reasons for not providing the 1,000 records); (iii) update
the record of that requester with respect to that PCD. Further requests from the same party would be rejected with a
suitable justiﬁcation. For such control to be in place, the server requires a record of events – an explicit account of
the history of the PCD, how they have been used, by whom and when. We observe that PCD can also be used as a
means to “wrap” a sensor or other data source, including whole sensor networks. We can have, for instance, a policy
establishing that “anyone is permitted to request the temperature reading of the sensor once every hour”.
3. A Language for Policies-carrying-Data
Much research has been carried out on data access policies since the early UNIX ﬁle systems[8,20,21]. Some notable
features our approach are as follows. We include means to refer to a history of events; examples are “the ﬁrst 10
people can use my data” and “anyone is permitted to use n records of my data”. We provide ﬁne-grained control
over who is to access the data, and under what circumstances; for instance, “invididual i285 is forbidden to access my
data” and “anyone from company x may use my data after 6PM”. Additionally we capture dynamic aspects of data
usage, examples being “whoever accesses D1 should not access D2” and “anyone who uses my data should provide
data”. We adapt and extend existing proposals on normative reasoning for multi-agent systems[7,9]: we represent roles
(of participants), data-related events (such as accessing records or publishing data collections), authorship of events
and attempts thereof, activation and deactivation conditions of policies, and the object of the policy, namely, the data
collection itself.
Syntax for Policy-carrying Data. We introduce a language for policies and a representation for policies-carrying-data,
and use these to build a simple operational semantics using states and histories. In our presentation we make use of
a countably inﬁnite set P of propositional variables p, q, r, t with or without subscripts. For simplicity, we only use
two logical operators, namely, negation ¬ and conjunction ∧. We regard a set of propositions {p1, . . . , pn} as the
conjunction of its elements, that is, {p1, . . . , pn} def= ∧ni=1 pi. Given two sets of (possibly negated) propositions Σ,Σ′,
we deﬁne an entailment relation Σ |= Σ′ which holds if, and only, if the following two conditions hold i) for all p ∈ Σ
then p ∈ Σ′; and ii) for all ¬p ∈ Σ then p  Σ′. Our deﬁnitions are shown in Figure 2, and explained below.
We introduce our language of policies via Def. 1; these are the “policy” part of our PCDs. We make use of a
subset Pα ⊆ P of propositional variables to create a vocabulary of action labels α which are the target of the policies.
These are formally stated in Def. 2 and we note that accessSome(n) and provideSome(n) are shorthands for the more
standard representation for propositional variables accessSomen and provideSomen respectively. A sample policy is
〈{¬accessSome(50)}, {accessSome(50)},PallaccessSome(50)〉 which stipulates that anyone (described by the role all)
is permitted to access 50 records of a data collection; the norm is activated if the records haven’t yet been accessed, and
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the norm is deactivated when 50 records are accessed. We explain below that policies are instantiated to individuals:
although the policy is stated in general terms, for policing/monitoring purposes (and for sanctioning/rewarding when
this is the case), we must keep a record of individuals’ activities and the policies which are applicable to them (via
their roles). We explain below how authorship of actions and roles are captured. PCDs are formally deﬁned as Def. 3:
we are not speciﬁc about what the data collections are – these can be individual records of a database, ﬁles, readings
from a sensor, and so on. Very importantly, rather than having data collections replicated in every PCD referring to
them, there could be only one copy of the data collection and all PCDs regulating its access would make use of a
unique locator such as a URL.
We use a ﬁnite and non-empty set of role labels R = {r1, . . . , rt} with a subsumption relation 	: R × R. The
subsumption allows us to capture relations among roles, such as power or, more related to the work presented here, “is-
a” relations. For instance, given R = {employee, scientist,manager}, we can deﬁne a subsumption relation scientist 	
employee and manager 	 employee to represent that scientists and managers are employees. In our work we assume
a ﬁnite and non-empty set of individuals A = {a1, . . . , as} uniquely identiﬁed. Moreover, individuals are associated
with a non-empty set of roles and a function roles : A × R 
→ 2R, roles(a,R) = R′ provides the set of roles R′ ⊆ R with
which a is associated.
Operational Semantics. Deﬁnitions 4–9 explain the operational semantics connecting the syntax of our policies with
an underlying computational model. We use the operational semantics to deﬁne mechanisms to check properties. Our
underlying computational model is a sequence of states, captured in Def. 4. The states represent “snapshots” of actual
events; each event is recorded as a proposition p. For compactness, we do not allow negated propositions in our states,
thus adopting the closed world assumption [16] which establishes that what is not stated/proven as true is deemed false.
For each proposition p ∈ Σ we associate an agent a ∈ A, perf (p,Σ) = a, thus representing who brought about p. A
sequence of states represents a history, formalised in Def. 5: histories record sequences of states, providing a linear
account of events and how they are temporally related.
We formally connect policies with histories. We deﬁne means to check if a policy was active in a history, in
Def. 6. We establish the conditions for policy compliance with the three cases below. We address the compliance of
obligations, prohibitions and permission with Def. 7, Def. 8, and Def. 9 respectively. We denote policy compliance as
the relation comply(π,H). We say that a policy has been violated in a history, denoted as violate(π,H) if, and only if,
active(π,H) holds and comply(π,H) does not hold; that is, the policy was active and the restrictions on what should
be done by whom have been violated.
Def. 1. A policy π is of the form 〈Σa,Σd ,Drα〉 where Σa,Σd , are sets of (possibly negated) propositions representing the activation and deactivation
conditions, respectively; D ∈ {O,F,P} is a deontic modality; r ∈ Roles is a role label; α is an action label (see Def. 2 below)
Def. 2. An action label α is accessAll (all records of a data collection are accessible); accessSome(n) (n records of a data collection are accessible);
provideAll (all records of a data collection are provided); or provideSome(n) (n records of a data collection are provided).
Def. 3. A policy-carrying data collection PCD is a pair 〈π,D〉 where π is a policy (cf. Def. 1) and D = {d1, . . . , dn} is a set of data items.
Def. 4. A state Σ = {p0, . . . , pn} is a possibly empty and ﬁnite set of propositions pi, 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Def. 5. A historyH = 〈Σ0, . . . ,Σm〉 is a possibly empty and ﬁnite sequence of states Σ j, 0 ≤ j ≤ m.
Def. 6. A policy π = 〈Σa,Σd ,Drα〉 was active in history H = 〈Σ1, . . . ,Σn〉 if, and only if, the following conditions hold: i) Σ1 |= Σa (the policy
became active at state 1), ii) Σn |= Σd (the policy became inactive at state n), and iii) Σi |= Σd , 1 < i < n (the policy was not deactivated in the
intervening states). We represent policy activation as the relation active(π,H).
Def. 7. A policy π = 〈Σa,Σd ,Orα〉 (an obligation) was complied with in history H = 〈Σ1, . . . ,Σn〉, if, and only if, the following conditions
hold: i) active(π,H) (the policy was active in the history) ii) Σ j |= {α} for some j, 1 < j < n (the action label occurs in some state j), and iii)
perf (α,Σ j) = a, r ∈ roles(a,R) (the agent who performed the action had role r associated with it).
Def. 8. A policy π = 〈Σa,Σd ,Frα〉 (a prohibition) was complied with in history H = 〈Σ0, . . . ,Σn〉 if, and only if, the following conditions hold: i)
active(π,H) (the policy was active in the history) ii) For all j, 1 < j < n, such that Σ j |= {α} we have perf (α,Σ j) = a, r  roles(a,R) (if α was
performed, then the agent who performed it did not have role r associated with it).
Def. 9. A policy π = 〈Σa,Σd ,Prα〉 (a permission) was complied with in history H = 〈Σ0, . . . ,Σn〉 if, and only if, the following conditions hold:
i) active(π,H) (the policy was active in the history) ii) for all j, 1 < j < n, such that Σ j |= {α} we have perf (α,Σ j) = a, r ∈ roles(a,R) (if α was
performed then the agent who performed it had role r associated with it).
Fig. 2: Deﬁnitions for Policy-carrying Data: Syntax (Defs. 1–3) and Operational Semantics (Defs.4–9)
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In open systems autonomous software agents are free to actually perform forbidden actions, but in a data-sharing
context we want to rule out any policy-violating behaviour. We thus consider an attempt to access data as evidence
of policy violation: consumers may try to access data they are not entitled to, and this attempt counts as if the data
had been accessed, even though our PCD will prevent this from happening. Our policy violation above is interpreted
under this light: the prohibited event is recorded but it did not actually happen.
The deﬁnitions of policy compliance/violation above allows us to relate policies following the usual deontic ab-
breviations [15], namely Op ≡ F¬p (p being obliged is equivalent to not achieving p being prohibited) and Fp ≡ ¬Pp
(p being prohibited is equivalent to not being permitted p). We sketch a proof below that such equivalences also
hold in our operational model. Without loss of generality, we assume that i) our policies have the same activation
and deactivation conditions and thus are active or not in exactly the same histories; and ii) the roles of our policies
are the same. This means condition 1 (active(π,H)) of Defs. 7–9 holds, and so does active(π,H) in the deﬁnition of
violation; thus we only need to check if comply(π,H) does not hold:
Claim: For anyH , π1 = 〈Σa,Σd,Orα〉 is complied with, iff, π2 = 〈Σa,Σd,Frα〉 is violated.
Proof: (⇒) If π1 = 〈Σa,Σd,Orα〉 was complied with then Σ j |= {α} for some j, 1 < j < n and perf (α,Σ j) =
a, r ∈ roles(a,R). This means that π2 = 〈Σa,Σd,Frα〉 was violated since comply(π,H) does not hold as there is one
j, 1 < j < n,Σ j |= {α}, perf (α,Σ j) = a but r ∈ roles(a,R). (⇐) If π2 = 〈Σa,Σd,Frα〉 has been violated then there is
one j, 1 < j < n,Σ j |= {α}, perf (α,Σ j) = a and r ∈ roles(a,R). These are precisely conditions 2–3 of Def. 7 describing
when π1 = 〈Σa,Σd,Orα〉 is complied with. 
Claim: For anyH , π1 = 〈Σa,Σd,Frα〉 is complied with, iff, π2 = 〈Σa,Σd,Prα〉 is violated.
Proof (⇒) For π1 (a prohibition) to be complied with, two possibilities may occur: i) there is a j, 1 < j < n,Σ j |= {α}
but perf (α,Σ j) = a, r  roles(a,R) (α was performed by someone who did not have role r associated with it) or ii) for
all j, 1 < j < n,Σ j |= {α} (no-one performed the prohibited action). Case i) goes against condition 2 of Def 9 (α was
performed by someone not permitted to do so) so implies in π2 = 〈Σa,Σd,Prα〉 being violated. Case ii) will only imply
in a violation of the permission if, and only if, all actions have to be explicitly permitted. (⇐) If π2 = 〈Σa,Σd,Prα〉 has
been violated then there is one j, 1 < j < n,Σ j |= {α}, perf (α,Σ j) = a and r  roles(a,R). This is precisely condition 2
of Def. 8 describing when π1 = 〈Σa,Σd,Frα〉 is complied with. 
Having all actions explicitly permitted (if not they are forbidden) might be necessary in some data-sharing scenar-
ios. Moreover, this will not lead to an excessive number of unnecessary policies, in that we can relate roles (hence
creating policies with a role r subsuming other roles ri, 1 < i < n) as well as relate actions (hence creating policies
with actions α such that α implies α j, 1 < j < m), so one single policy 〈Σa,Σd,Prα〉 stands for a set of policies⋃n
i=1
⋃m
j=1{〈Σa,Σd,Priα j〉}.
We note that the operational semantics provides a counterpart to the usual Kripke semantics used in (modal) deontic
logics [15]. This enables us to draw parallels between deontic equivalences and relationships among our policies, as
shown above.
PCD and Individual Agents. PCD are ultimately aimed at individuals, although they are speciﬁed in general terms.
The role of a policy is ultimately adopted by individual agents; actions are performed by agents, this being captured by
the perf (p,Σ) = a function which provides the agent a responsible for performing p ∈ Σ. Compliance and violation
are also associated to individuals.
The compliance deﬁnitions (Defs. 7–9) can be extended to obtain the identity of the individual agents responsible
for complying with the policy. Given π = 〈Σa,Σd,Orα〉 (an obligation) and H = 〈Σ1, . . . ,Σn〉, comply(π,H) such
that Σ j |= {α} and perf (α,Σ j) = a, r ∈ roles(a,R), then a was responsible for complying with the policy. Similar
deﬁnitions can be provided for prohibitions and permissions. We denote the compliance of an individual a to policy π
in historyH as comply(π,H , a). Since more than one agent may comply with the policy, we can compute them all as
complyAll(π,H , A′), A′ ⊆ A, such that, for all a ∈ A′, comply(π,H , a).
In realistic settings we need to consider longer histories in which a policy is complied with or violated many
times. We introduce an operator “•” to merge/split histories; we say that H = H1 • H2 • · · · • Hn holds if, and
only if, Hi = 〈Σi1, . . . ,Σimi〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and H = 〈Σ11, . . . ,Σ1m1 ,Σ21, . . . ,Σ2m2 , . . . ,Σn1, . . . ,Σ1mn〉. With this operator, we
can compute, given a history, all the sub-histories in which a policy was complied with (or violated): comply∗(π,
H , {H1, . . . ,Hp}) holds if, and only if, H = H′ • Hi • H′′, comply(π,Hi), 1 ≤ i ≤ p, that is, we decompose H
into all those sub-histories Hi in which the policy was complied with. A similar computation can be deﬁned for
violations: violate∗(π,H , {H1, . . . ,Hp}) holds if, and only if, H = H′ • Hi • H′′, violate(π,Hi), 1 ≤ i ≤ p. We
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Algorithm 1: Individual Access
input: PCDs, A,R
output: DAs = {〈D1, A1〉, . . . , 〈Dn, An〉}
1: function INDIVACCESS(PCDs, A,R)
2: DAs← ∅
3: for PCD ∈ PCDs do
4: if PCD = 〈〈Σa,Σe,Prα〉,D〉 then
5: DAs← DAs ∪ {〈D, ∅〉}
6: for a ∈ A do
7: if ∃ra ∈ roles(a,R), ra 	 r then
8: DAs← DAs \ {〈D, AD〉}
9: AD ← AD ∪ {a}
10: DAs← DAs ∪ {〈D, AD〉}
11: return DAs
12: end function
Algorithm 2: Individual Obligations
input: PCDs, a,R
output: αDs = {〈α1,D1〉, . . . , 〈αn,Dn〉}
1: function OWNOBLS(PCDs, a,R)
2: αDs← ∅
3: for PCD ∈ PCDs do
4: if PCD = 〈〈Σa,Σe,Orα〉,D〉 then
5: if ∃ra ∈ roles(a,R), ra 	 r′ then
6: αDs← αDs ∪ {〈α,D〉}
7: return αDs
8: end function
Algorithm 3: Access Control
input: PCDs, a,R, α,D,H
output: GrantAccess ∈ {,⊥}
1: function CHKACCSS(PCDs, a,R, α,D,H)
2: letH = 〈Σ1, . . . ,Σn〉
3: GrantAccess← ⊥
4: if 〈〈Σa,Σe,Prα〉,D〉 ∈ PCDs &
active(〈Σa,Σe,Prα〉, 〈Σk , . . . ,Σn〉) then
5: if ∃ra ∈ roles(a,R), ra 	 r then
6: GrantAccess← 
7: if 〈〈Σ′a,Σ′e,Fr′α〉,D〉 ∈ PCDs &
active(〈Σ′a,Σ′e,Fr′α〉, 〈Σl, . . . ,Σn〉) then
8: if ∃ra ∈ roles(a,R), ra 	 r′ then
9: GrantAccess← ⊥
10: return GrantAccess
11: end functionFig. 4: Reasoning mechanisms
also deﬁne means to compute those individuals responsible for policy compliance/violation: comply∗(π,H , {H1, . . . ,
Hp}, {aH1 , . . . , aHp }) if, and only if, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ p, comply(π,Hi, aHi ). Again, there might be more than one agent
responsible for policy compliance/violation in each sub-history, and we can obtain these as complyAll∗(π,H , {H1, . . . ,
Hp}, {AH1 , . . . , AHp }) where for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ p, AHi ⊆ A, complyAll∗(π,Hi, AHi ). With these basic operations, we can
deﬁne policing mechanisms to dispense rewards and sanctions to individuals, based on histories of states and policies;
we present one such mechanism in Alg. 3 in Section 4.
We make use of our formalism to represent typical examples of PCD; these are shown in Fig. 3. PCD (1) captures
a simple permission to access all records of a data collection. The activation condition speciﬁes that the permission
is in place if the records have not yet been accessed, and the policy is deactivated when the records are accessed;
the policy stipulates a “one-off” access to the data. The all
role stipulates that anyone can take advantage of this policy.
PCD (2) illustrates a useful way to inter-relate policies. It
states that anyone who accesses D1 is forbidden to access
D2. The “⊥” is the “false” proposition which never occurs
in any state; as a deactivation condition, it stipulates that the
policy will never be deactivated once it is activated. This
〈
policy
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, {accessAll(D1)}︸︷︷︸
deactivation
,PallaccessAll(D1)︸︷︷︸
target
〉,
data
︷︸︸︷
D1 〉 (1)
〈〈{accessAll(D1)}, {⊥},FallaccessAll(D2)〉,D2〉 (2)
〈〈{accessAll(D1)}, {provideSome(300,D2)},OallprovideSome(300,D2)〉,D2〉 (3)
Fig. 3: Sample PCDs
creates a “chain” of events relating PCDs: if someone makes use of the permission to access D1 (established by
PCD 1) then it is forbidden to access D2. We also specify PCD (3), stating that those who access D1 are obliged to
provide 300 records to (be added to) D2. The obligation is deactivated after the agent who accessed D1 provides some
data.
4. Reasoning with/about PCDs
We present in Fig. 4 three mechanisms to enable stakeholders to reason with and about their PCDs. Initially, we
show in Alg. 1 a process whereby publishers of PCDs can obtain the identity of individual agents who have access
(via their associated roles) to data collections. The algorithm describes function INDIVACCESS with input parameters
comprising a set of PCDs, a set of agents and their roles (roles associated to agent can be obtained via the roles function
introduced early in Section 3). The function returns a possibly empty set of pairs 〈D, AD〉, D being a (reference to a)
data collection of a PCD, and AD ⊆ A a (possibly empty) set of individual agent identities; these are the agents which
have access to the various data collections.
In Alg. 2 we introduce a mechanism which analyses a set of PCDs and gathers, for a given individual a, all the
obligations which might apply to it. The algorithm describes a function OWNOBLS which gathers a possibly empty set
of pairs 〈α,D〉 representing actions α which a is obliged to carry out with respect to data collection D. The algorithm
assumes that activation conditions will hold and hence the obligation will be in place. This function is invoked by
consumers of PCDs, so that they can assess the responsibilities they might bring upon themselves when registering
with speciﬁc roles.
Finally, we illustrate how our PCDs and their operational semantics can be used in policing. We relate permissions
and prohibitions for data sharing in a pragmatic fashion. Permissions explicitly indicate who can access the data;
if the agent is not permitted, then it will not have access to the data and any attempt to access the data will be
recorded as a potential violation. According to this view, one would think that prohibitions would no longer be needed
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since anything that is not explicitly permitted is forbidden. However, prohibitions can be interpreted as permissions
being revoked under special circumstances. In this interpretation, prohibitions take precendence over permissions,
thus making permissions void under certain circumstances. An example would be a permission to access D and a
prohibition to rule out its access at certain times.
A mechanism to police data access factoring in this relation is presented in Alg. 3. It takes as input a set of PCDs,
an agent id a, the set R of roles, an action α, a target data collection D and a history H . The history is used as a
“sliding window” from a state Σk (or Σl) in the past to the current state Σn. The mechanism initially assumes access
is prevented (line 3), then it carries out an analysis of existing PCDs. In step 4 the mechanism checks if, in the set
of PCDs, there is a permission on action α concerned with data D (given as a parameters) and with associated role
r; it also checks if the permission is currently valid within the window 〈Σk, . . . ,Σn〉. Step 5 checks if the permission
is applicable to agent a (via one of its roles ra); if it is, then access is granted (provisionally). Step 7 checks if a
prohibition on action α over D and with associated role r′ exists in the set of PCDs; it also checks that the policy is
active within a window 〈Σl, . . . ,Σn〉. If such a PCD exists, then in step 8 we check if the prohibition applies to a (via
one of its roles ra); if it is applicable, then access is denied, and we record a’s attempt to perform α in D.
All reasoning mechanisms terminate since all loops are over ﬁnite sets, and all tests (namely 	 and active) also
terminate. Alg. 1 is correct: it exhaustively checks all policies of PCD which grant permission to D (with any action
α), and it considers if each agent in any of their roles (and their subsuming roles) is addressed by the permission; if it
is, then the agent is added to those agents with access to D. Similarly, Alg. 2 is correct in that it exhaustively checks
the set PCD looking for obligations which apply to any of the roles ra (or their subsuming roles) associated with an
agent. Finally, Alg. 3 is correct in that, within the period covered by historyH , it ﬁnds at least one active permission
applicable to a (with provisional access granted) for which there is not one active prohibition applicable to a.
5. Related Work
Berners-Lee has called for a bill of rights or magna carta [12] to address issues of privacy, censorship and control of
the internet. While that is an on-going and evolving debate, the proposal here seeks to provide a potential mechanism
at the operational level that can capture speciﬁc features reﬂecting the normative principles that Berners-Lee promotes
both in terms of the web architecture [4] and actors’ behavioural constraints.
Research on security and privacy explored alternatives for authentication and authorization, including the popular
role-based access control (RBAC). These assume, however, that the principal can only act on the subject in a context
where the principal’s actions can be observed and controlled. This clearly does not hold in an environment in which
data is shared and propagated largely without oversight, although[6,11] begin to address this scenario. Nevertheless,
once the data is outside the domain in which the policy can be enforced, the guarantees that a security framework
such as RBAC provides almost certainly cannot be upheld and encryption probably only delays access. Thus, ex-
pectations about the treatment of data must be revised to accept transparency in place of privacy, although this too
cannot necessarily be assured, some of the practicalities of which are discussed in [17]. Hansen[10] sets out higher level
requirements: “unlinkability when possible and desired, transparency on possible and actual linkages, and the feasi-
bility for data subjects to exercise control or at least intervene in the processing of data.” We notice “where possible”:
there cannot be absolute guarantees, only best efforts, hence our notion of satisﬁcing security.
Others have independently used the term “policy-carrying data”. The research presented in [24] and[18] introduces
similar concepts, however there is little or no detail about the policy languages they support or indeed their semantics,
instead, their presentations concentrate on encryption aspects, architecture and information models, and how their
approaches can be implemented/integrated with speciﬁc technologies.
At the mathematical and detail level, our work draws upon research on normative multi-agent systems[1], especially
on proposals for norm speciﬁcation[7,19,23] and normative (practical) reasoning[3,9]. Our notation is heavily inspired
by existing work[7,9,23] but we simplify the components of our policies, leaving out aspects such as deadlines and
sanctions/rewards. A rule-based language such as [9], being Turing-complete, would allows us to represent arbitrary
concepts, but its expressiveness would render reasoning mechanisms more complex. We note that our semantics – the
explicit recording of states of the computation – has been used in the literature, either as Kripke structures (providing
the usual underpinning of modal deontic logics [15]) or as operational semantics [9,22]. However, our proposal is the ﬁrst
attempt at adapting and extending work on normative multi-agent systems to regulate data access.
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6. Conclusions and Future Work
The increasing volume of personal data being created by the internet of things is making it unavoidable to ﬁnd
adequate answers to questions related to data access rights and responsibilities. The volume and variety of data cou-
pled with the inappropriateness of existing legislation risk an unregulated “free-for-all” environment. What happens
might be somewhat different, but until the consumers and producers of data are governed by a framework that offers
equitable trade-offs between rights and responsibilities and delivers sufﬁcient transparency, the risk remains. This has
been the motivation for the principle of policy-carrying data put forward here. We have intentionally kept features to
a minimum and focussed on establishing the mathematical foundations of PCD, and illustrating what can be achieved
with it, in terms of policy descriptions and how to reason with and about them. Wemake a case for transparency, in lieu
of security and privacy, since either of the latter is likely to be delivered in terms of their traditional black-and-white
interpretations. This work makes a concrete contribution towards laying the foundations for a transparent data econ-
omy. For future work we shall explore extensions to the expressiveness of PCD (e.g., adding deadlines, sanctions and
rewards) and study reasoning mechanisms which factor these extensions in. We also want to apply model-checking[2]
techniques to study properties in sets of PCDs such as “which obligations (if any) cannot be achieved?”
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